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Recent Inheritance Tax and Estate Tax
D0..Decisions
is review will not attempt to be exhaustive but will merely
present some of the more significant and important inheritance
tax and federal estate tax cases which have been decided since
the excellent note on this subject which appeared in this journal
in September, 1921.1
For the purpose of presenting this summary in an orderly way,
we have arbitrarily divided the decisions into three main classes:
I. Those involving constitutional law questions;
II. Those involving general questions of taxation;
III. Those involving questions of procedure.
I
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw DECISIONS
The most important case involving constitutional questions which
has been decided within the last few years is the case of Frick v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," decided on June 1st of this year
by the United States Supreme Court. This case involved three main
qustions:
(1) Whether a state can, in levying an inheritance tax, include
the full value of tangible personal property, e. g., paintings, statuary,
household furnishings and farming implements, situated outside of
its boundaries;
(2) Whether a state, in levying an inheritance tax on foreign
corporation stocks which it has a right to tax, but which, are also
properly taxed in other jurisdictions where the corporations were
3 9 California Law Review, 505.
a (1925) 69 L. Ed., Adv. Ops. 692, 45 Sup Ct. Rep. 63.
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Anwa! POSSESSION: PERSONAL PROPERTY: TACKING AND
PAYI-i1T OFTAXES-In the course of a comment in a recent issue
of this REVIEW' it was pointed out that the District Court of Appeal
in the case of San Francisco Credit Clearing House v. Wells,'
in effect approved the doctrine of tacking the adverse possession of
personal property by successive adverse holders. The case was
reversed in the Supreme Court' which held by way of dictum that
there could be no tacking even though there be privity between the
successive holders. The later dictum is based upon the ground that
the original holder was guilty of conversion by disposing of the
property before acquiring title to it and his successors were also
converters as soon as they acquired possession. A new right of
action thus accrued to the owner with each new conversion. The
dictum is opposed to the weight of authority on the subject in
this country.' The same result, however, has been reached in
England,' Tennessee' and South Carolina." The dictum was not
necessary to a decision in the case, but since the court raised the
question, it might well have recognized the doctrine of tacking as
generally accepted both as to land and chattels.' The vital question
appears to be, if the defendant claims through and under his prede-
cessors all of whom have held a connected, consistent and continuous
clainm of title for the statutory period should not the cause of action
against them be considered in essence one and the same cause of
action? Should there not be a relation back of the possession of the
defendant to the original taking, thus blending the successive pos-
sessions into one?' The important consideration is not that there
2 13 California Law Review, 256.
s'(Nov. 12, 1924) 45 Cal. App. Dec. 642.
'(August 29, 1925) 70 Cal. Dec. 253, 239 Pac. 319.
'Hicks v. Fluit (1860) 21 Ark. 463; Gaillard v. Hudson (1888) 81 Ga.
738, 8 S. E. 534; Luter v. Hutchinson (1902) 30 Tex. Civ. App. 511, 70 S.
W. 1013; Dragoo v. Cooper (1873) 9 Bush (Ky.) 629.
' Miller v. Dell [18911 1. Q. B. 468, 60 L. J., Q. B. 404, 63 L. T. 693.
*Wells v. Ragland (1852) 31 Tenn. 398. 1 Swan (Tenn.) 501.
I In South Carolina the rule against tacking applies to land as well except
in cases of descent. Beadle v. Hunter (1848) 3 Strob. (S. C.) 331; King v.
Smith (1838) Rice Law Rep. (S. C.) 10; Garrett v. Weinberg (1896) 48 S. C.
28, 26 S. E. 3, 1I8
*'Gaillard v. Hudson, supra, n. 4 (horse); Collins v. Gray (1908) 154 Cal.
131, 97 Pac. 142 (land).
*The "relation back" doctrine or fiction is resorted to only in the
demands of justice and fairness. In situations like that in the instant case
the necessity for its application arises only when the action is brought after
the several adverse holders have had possession for the statutory period. The
same considerations of justice and fairness do ,not require the denial of a
new right of action against the last converter 'when the action is brought
before instead of after the running of the statute. An analogy in this regard
might be pointed out in the law of accession to personal property. There,
in what would seem to be a somewhat involved situation, there is at one and
the same time a relation back to the original conversion and a new right of
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has been a substitution of iossessors but that the owner's title has
been continuously and uninterruptedly denied for the statutory
period. As Professor Ballantine has put it with respect to real
property so it is with regard to personal property: "The same flag
has been kept flying for the whole period. It is the same ouster and
disseisin. If the statute runs it quiets a title which has been con-
sistently asserted and exercised as against the true owner and
possession of the prior holder justly enures to the benefit of the last.""
If the purpose of the statute is to quiet titles openly asserted, the
dictum in this case is apparently contrary to that purpose. It must
be admitted, however, that due to the ambulatory character of
personal property the owner is in a more disadvantageous position
in protecting himself than the owner of realty. The adverse pos-
sessor and the personalty may move from place to place within the
state or even from state to state entirely unknown to the owner
who has no opportunity to assert his title. In the case of realty the
situs remains fixed. However this can be taken into consideration
in determining whether the possession of the personalty has been
open and notorious.1 The statute begins to run as soon as the
possession is open and notorious regardless of the knowledge of the
owner. 2  If the property is shown to have been held continuously,
openly, and notoriously for the statutory period by several succes-
sive possessors, all claiming under the same title but no one of whom
action on the ground of a new conversion. If an innocent converter improves
the chattel and then sells it to a bona fide purchaser, the latter is guilty of
converting the improved chattel, the title to which is in the owner. It has
been held, however, that since the owner could recover from the original
converter only the value of the chattel at the time of the original conversion,
he is limited to the same amount in his recovery against the innocent pur-
chaser. Whitney v. Huntington (1887) 37 Minn. 197, 33 N. W. 561; Wall v.
Holloman (1911) 156 N. C. 275, 72 S. E. 369. Contra: Wing v. Milliken
(1898) 91 Me. 387, 40 Atl. 138. The "relation back" doctrine is applied in
other branches of the law, e.g., delivery and acceptance of deeds, De Conick
v. De Conick (1908) 154 Mich. 187, 117 N. W. 570, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 417(delivery of deeds); Green v. Skinner (1921) 185 Cal. 435, 197 Pac. 60; Hib-
bard v. Smith (1885) 67 Cal. 547, 4 Pac. 473, 8 Pac. 46 (acceptance of deeds),
and acquisition of title by satisfaction of judgment. White v. Martin (1834)
1 Port (Ala.) 215, 26 Am. Dec. 365.
10 Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 Harvard Law
Review, 135, 158.
22 It is for the jury to determine whether or not there has been open and
notorious possession. Thomas v. England (1886) 71 Cal. 456, 12 Pac. 491;
Pendill v. Marquette County Agric. Soc. (1893) 95 Mich. 491, 55 N. W. 384.
Thus, the open and notorious character of the holding would seem to depend,
not so much upon an absolute standard of "openness" as upon the nature of
the particular chattel and the circumstances of the particular case. A circum-
stance that should be given some weight js whether or not the owner had a
reasonable opportunity of knowing the wh ereabouts of the property and of
asserting his title. It has generally been held that an action is barred against
an innocent purchaser of stolen property holding for the statutory period, for
the possession of a bona fide purchaser is uniformly considered to be suffi-
ciently open to satisfy the requirements of the statute even though the owner
does not know the whereabouts of his property. Fears v. Sykes (1858) 35
Miss. 633.
12 Yore v. Murphy (1896) 18 Mont. 342, 45 Pac. 217 (sheep).
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alone has held for the statutory period, is it not unfair to innocent
purchasers to give a new right of action with each change in pos-
session? It would seem that the owner of the personalty is given
ample consideration if the statute does not commence to run against
him until the possession becomes open and notorious. It is to be
hoped that the court will not feel itself bound by its dictum which
leads to a rule of title to personal property inconsistent with the
well established rule as to real estate.1 '
A further question was raised by the instant case, but dismissed
with little discussion, namely, does possession for the statutory
period by the adverse holder of personalty bar the remedy only or
vest the possessor with title?" The Civil Code section 1007 pro-
vides that "Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of
Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar action for the recovery of property
confers a title thereto, denominated a title by prescription, which is
sufficient against all." Would it not be an extremely narrow
construction of this section to confine it to section 318, Code of
Civil Procedure which bars the action for real property and not
apply it as well to section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which bars the action for the recovery of personal property? This
problem has already been sufficiently discussed in the previous
note on the instant case.1' However it may be asked, if the
courts in a given jurisdiction hold that title is gained by adverse
possession for the statutory period will they necessarily permit
tacking? Does denial of title imply a denial of tacking? Is title
something which slowly grows as the statute runs, attaining its
maturity at the end of the statutory period or is it spontaneously
transferred immediately after the statute has run? If the property
is sold before the statute has run and title could have been gained
by holding the full period the purchaser is in effect buying a title
that has not quite "matured" and it would seem unjust for the court
to give a new right of action on the ground of a new conversion.
In such cases one would expect to find, and does find, tacking
allowed." On the other hand it would seem that courts holding that
title is not created by adverse possession of a chattel for the statutory
period have but a short step to take to hold that there can be no
tacking even with privity. The right of action in such case is gone,
but the title remains in the owner who might readily be given a new
right of action with each new interference with that title. This was
ILACollins v. Gray, supra, n. 8; Botsford v. Eyraud (1906) 148 Cal. 431, 83
Pac. 1008.
14 Mr. Justice Seawell did not consider it necessary to answer that ques-
tion but stated that "a careful examination of the decisions of this state"has
failed to disclose to our investigation a single case in which section 1007.
Civil Code, has been applied to the acquisition of title to personal property."
70 Cal. Dec. 253, 257. Mr. Chief Justice Myers in his concurring opinion stated
that he is not prepared to say there can be no tacking of successive possessors
who are in privity with one another if #0tle to personal property may be
acquired by prescription.
IS 13 California Law Review, 256.
" Hicks v. Fluit, supra, n. 4; Gailnard v. Hudson, supra, n. 4.
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the view of the English court in the case of Miller v. Dell," in
which title and tacking were denied in the same case.
A second and surprising dictum in the instant case holds that
payment of taxes is one of the essential elements of the acquisition
of title to personal property by adverse possession. The Supreme
Court has formerly held that payment of taxes is not an element of
adverse possession unless made so by express statutory require-
ment." The Code of Civil Procedure, section 325, pertains to land
exclusively in requiring payment of taxes for the acquisition of title
by adverse possession. Is the court reversing its former holding or
does it mean to amend the Code to embrace personal property?
R. J. T.

